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ABSTRACT
The policies of economic austerity are invoked whenever a country's public
deficit is spiralling out of control. Given the intricate channels through which
deficits and debt can be financed, i.e. either through borrowing or money cre-
ation, manipulation of public deficits may pose significant constraints on eco-
nomic growth, social cohesion and political stability. In this context, austerity is
a policy expedient that, if applied irresponsibly, might have irreversible effects
on both economic and social structures. In Greece economic policies of austeri-
ty, in conjunction with internal devaluation, have been adopted in an attempt to
improve competitiveness, correct external deficits and promote export-led
growth. In this paper, by scrutinising a range of key economic indicators, we
argue that austerity has depressed significantly the real economy in Greece,
threatening further an already crippled economic environment with a danger of
further stagnation. We also provide econometric evidence for the period 2000 -
2013 which shows that the positive contribution of net exports to economic
growth in Greece has been as a result of relatively low domestic demand, not to
relative gains in the international price competitiveness of Greek enterprises.
Finally, it is envisaged that the lack of adequate endogenous capacity as a
means of galvanising economic growth has the potential to usher in prolonged
periods of economic depression.
1. INTRODUCTION
POLICIES OF ECONOMIC AUSTERITY are invoked whenever a country’s publicdeficit is spiralling out of control. In order to minimise the potential fordebt to spiral out of control in such circumstances, policymakers have
tended to reduce public expenditure and increase taxes swiftly. Given the
intricate channels through which deficits can be financed, i.e. either through
borrowing or money creation, unprecedented reduction of public deficits may
pose significant constraints on economic growth, social cohesion and political
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stability. In this context, austerity is undoubtedly a policy expedient that, if
applied irresponsibly, could have irreversible and damaging effects on both
economic and social structures resulting in hysteresis, i.e. prolonged periods
of high unemployment which tend to increase the rate of unemployment above
the rate associated with non-accelerating inflation.
Austerity has historically been associated closely with polices in the
context of national emergencies, such as wars and national defence. Over
time, however, capitalism has evolved into an economic system in which gov-
ernments, largely as a result of the adoption of widespread social welfare pro-
visions, have started experiencing pressures resulting from debt accumula-
tion. During economic slumps, the publicly- funded welfare state is likely to
come under pressure, in so far as cutting provision to voters would be some-
thing that no government could consider lightly, because of the ensuing neg-
ative political implications.
Apart from their association with economic downturns, austerity poli-
cies have not only been regarded as an economic necessity but also as a moral
obligation (Krugman 2015; Alexiou and Nellis 2013). Recently, politicians have
resorted to a narrative that is permeated with slogans such as ‘we have lived
beyond our means for too long’ or ‘it is now the time for frugality and restraint’.
In the wake of the 2007 global financial crisis, a heated debate started
to unfold in relation to the additional public debt associated with the bail-out
of financial institutions. In the European Union, democratically-elected gov-
ernments have been replaced by technocrats — often former Goldman Sachs
and ECB bankers — endowed with powers to implement unconditionally
extreme policies of austerity.
Keynes (1936) noted that financial markets are subject to irrational
swings — between rampant optimism and overwhelming pessimism.
Assuming that austerity fails then, in all likelihood, financial markets will
consider governments to be incompetent in terms of managing their deficits.
So, the fundamental question that we raise is: what is the purpose of austeri-
ty? Blyth (2013 p 73) argues that what has happened since the onset of the
financial crisis in 2007 is ‘the greatest bait and switch in modern history’.
The primary objective of this study is to assess the efficacy of austeri-
ty policies that have been implemented in Greece since the onset of the eco-
nomic crisis. In addition, we challenge the contention that the observed
improvement in Greece's current account deficit has been the result of com-
petitiveness that internal devaluation has promoted. To this end we employ
simulations, on the basis of which we provide evidence on the extent to which
changes in demand and the real effective exchange rate affect the external bal-
ance.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 touches on the
theoretical underpinnings of austerity whilst Section 3 provides an assess-
ment of the impact of austerity by examining the behaviour of key Greek eco-
nomic indicators. In addition, the empirical investigation yields evidence on
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the extent to which the current economic framework is capable of triggering
an export-led growth recovery through improved competitiveness. Section 4
highlights on the implications of austerity and proposes alternative policies
whilst Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2. AUSTERITY: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The fundamental theoretical argument for austerity is underpinned by main-
stream, neoclassical economics. In so far as public expenditure crowds out
investment (given a perfectly inelastic long-run aggregate supply at full
employment), and the belief that markets are more efficient than the state, the
only way economic growth can be promoted would be through reductions in
public sector deficits financed by raising taxes or cutting public expenditure.
Given that higher taxes and higher government expenditure are both envis-
aged to stifle market efficiency, then the preferred solution is reduced expen-
diture, i.e. austerity.
Ricardo and Smith were amongst the first to engage in a public debate
on the controversy surrounding budget deficits and public debt. For Smith
(1957), even though public borrowing was inevitable, as war expenditure could
not possibly be financed solely through taxation, the burden of public debt
had to be scrutinised carefully. In view of the burgeoning deficit that Britain
had incurred during the Napoleonic wars, Ricardo (1951) developed a keen
interest in public debt and, more importantly, in the distinction between tax
financing and borrowing. The real revolution in macroeconomics, however,
was sparked by Keynes in 1936, when he introduced the controversial notion
of deficit spending as a means of boosting income and employment — a notion
that, presently, is even more topical than ever. More specifically, Keynes
(1936) recommended that when an economy is in recession, an unbalanced
rather than a balanced public budget is needed in order to spend the way out
of recession. The Keynesian message in support of deficit spending when in a
recession was largely ignored by policymakers in the early 1930s, but was
embraced enthusiastically by the G-20 governments in 2009 as a means of
preventing another global recession.
The current neoliberal economic dogma considers discretionary fiscal
policy largely to be ineffective as a tool of stabilisation policy (Arestis 2007,
2009). In other words, the fiscal stance has no impact on aggregate demand,
suggesting that the traditional Keynesian multiplier effect is close to zero or
even negative in some cases. Such a proposition draws its legitimacy from the
empirical evidence based on the so-called ‘crowding-out effect’, as well as the
theoretical underpinnings of Ricardian Equivalence, as revamped by Barro
(1974).
It is well-documented that the Greek debt crisis was the precursor of
the widespread fiscal austerity measures that have dominated European pol-
icy since (Krugman 2015; Alexiou and Nellis 2013).3 In many advanced coun-
tries the increases in public debt can to some extent be ascribed to govern-
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ments’ policies to deal with the high private debt accumulated during the
years preceding the financial crisis (De Grauwe 2010).
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, a number of European coun-
tries with burgeoning budget deficits and national debts imposed upon them-
selves austerity policies as a means of consolidating their public finances.
What is striking, however, is that even some of the stronger economies such
as France, Germany and the UK opted for measures of fiscal austerity as well.
In addition, to ameliorate any future crises the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM) was introduced by the European Commission in an effort to address
and resolve effectively the crises associated with the indebtedness of some
eurozone countries. The ESM, through issuing debt instruments, provides
loans and other forms of financial assistance to eurozone economies.
The official ‘green light’ for policies of fiscal consolidation came in 2010
at a meeting in Toronto where the G-20 countries endorsed a strategic plan for
the advanced economies, on the basis of which deficits were to be halved by
2013 and debt-to-GDP ratios stabilised by 2016 (Kitromilides 2011). In the
United States, the then chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, Ben Bernanke,
in a speech addressing the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and
Reform, firmly posited that a deficit reduction plan was urgently needed in
order for the US government to maintain its credibility in financial markets
(Bernanke 2010). In the same vein, the Congressional Budget Office (2010)
insisted that restoring market credibility was predicated on much tougher
measures being taken promptly. Flynn also advocated the immediate intro-
duction of austerity measures by arguing that the European debt crisis is ‘a
cautionary tale and that it is always best to take action to shore up budget
deficits before market forces demand it’ (Flynn, 2010 p 20). A similar ration-
ale has also driven the conceptualisation of UK policy-making as a programme
of rapid deficit reduction, mainly through deep public expenditure cuts,
agreed and announced by the then coalition government partners in May
2010.
International organisations such as the OECD, the Basel-based Bank
for International Settlements (BIS), as well as influential voices such as the
Chicago-based economist Raghuram Rajan and Pimco’s Bill Gross, also
demanded that monetary and fiscal tightening should be pursued to fight
depression (Krugman 2012).
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) produced a much-quoted paper on eco-
nomic growth in a time of debt, which gave credence to the adoption of the
austerity measures which followed. Specifically, the paper claimed that eco-
nomic growth dwindles when the government debt-to-GDP ratio rises above 90
per cent, thus providing ammunition for many politicians to defend their aus-
terity policies. A case in point is the time when the UK’s Chancellor of the
Exchequer, George Osborne, was invited to give an annual Mais Lecture in
February 2010. Osborne (2010) stated categorically:
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as Mr Rogoff puts it, there is no question that the most significant vulnera-
bilities that emerge from a recession is the soaring government debt. It is
very likely that this will trigger the next crisis as the government's finances
are stretched so wide. The latest research suggests that if the government
debt-to-GDP ratio rises above 90 per cent then the negative effect on long
term growth becomes highly significant.
However, the evidence provided by Reinhart and Rogoff was swiftly
challenged (see Herndon et al 2013). According to Skidelsky (2013), Reinhart
and Rogoff failed to explain the transmission mechanism between high debt
and lower economic growth, placing too much credibility on what was merely
a statistical correlation. The implicit theory states that excessive state spend-
ing crowds out productive private sector investment spending. But this could
also apply to tax-financed spending compared with debt-financed spending.
So what makes the debt-to-GDP ratio the variable with the utmost impor-
tance? Ostensibly, what the authors had in mind was the reluctance of indi-
viduals to lend money to the government in the event of excessive debt levels.
A high debt-to-GDP ratio makes the markets uneasy as they start to factor in
the risk of default, driving up the term structure of interest rates, which in
turn hampers economic growth.
It would be utterly fallacious to assume that a country such as the UK,
with a central bank which has the authority to issue its own currency (if and
when deemed necessary), should be treated as one which relies on the senti-
ment of bond holders particularly foreign bond holders. It is in this sense that
we can argue that the UK was possibly one of the few countries that did have
a choice between austerity and stimulus (a choice that was not open to Greece
in the absence of quantitative easing by the ECB4). Stimulating the economy
through an expansionary fiscal policy can be expected to boost national
incomes, lower the debt-to-GDP ratio and drive down the market value of new
bonds.
More critically, Nersisyan and Wray (2010) argue that Reinhart and
Rogoff failed to draw an explicit distinction in their dataset between 'sovereign'
and ‘non-sovereign’ countries. Sovereign countries have the freedom to pur-
chase government bonds infinitely as well as the freedom to devalue their cur-
rencies. The implication of such a distinction is of vital importance as sover-
eign countries -— countries with their own floating-rate currency - face differ-
ent debt constraints from non-sovereign countries — countries without their
own currency or who participate in fixed-exchange rate systems, hence ren-
dering Reinhart and Rogoff's estimates invalid. In addition, Nersisyan and
Wray (2010) maintain that in the case of sovereign countries, low growth may
cause public deficits to increase, rather than the other way round as suggest-
ed by Reinhart and Rogoff.
The premise upon which the conventional wisdom of fiscal consolida-
tion is based, relates to both real aggregate demand in the short-run and the
role of expectations in the long-run. Hellwig and Neumann (1987) suggest that
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the direct effect on aggregate demand will be negative, but that the indirect
effect will be positive as expectations improve provided that the consolidation
programme is credible. In passing, it should be noted that Hellwig and
Neuman do not state explicitly that fiscal austerity will boost the economy
through stimulating aggregate demand. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), in a sem-
inal paper on the effects of fiscal contraction in the Danish and Irish
economies, found that in the case of Denmark, even in the presence of
increased taxes, cuts in government spending can have a positive impact on
consumption. The Irish experience, however, highlights the potential impor-
tance of liquidity constraints for the operation of this mechanism. The poten-
tial expansionary effects are primarily ascribed to the impact of the monetary
disinflation on nominal interest rates which, through the corresponding drop
in real rates, stimulates aggregate demand.
In the same vein, Alesina and Ardagna (2009 p 15) argue that ‘fiscal
adjustments, even large ones, which reduce budget deficits, can be successful
in reducing relatively quickly debt over GDP ratios without causing recessions.
Fiscal adjustments based upon spending cuts are those with, by far, the high-
est chance of success. Politicians are typically reluctant and often delay the
adoption of restrictive fiscal policies making the adjustment even more costly’.
In view of the above, Alesina, in April 2010 in Madrid, assured European
finance ministers that large credible and decisive cuts to reduce public deficits
would be accompanied and immediately followed by sustained growth, rather
than recessions even in the very short run (Alesina, 2010).
Romer (2011 p 17), on the one hand, acknowledges that Alesina’s paper
became ‘very influential’, but on the other hand posits that ‘ … even more strik-
ing is the number who assert forcefully that fiscal austerity — getting the budg-
et down immediately — would be good for unemployment and growth’.
In another study, Taylor and Jordà (2013) find that austerity measures
in the UK are to be held responsible for reducing GDP growth by 1 per cent
each year. In fact, they argue that in recession, austerity prolongs the pain
much more so than in the boom. It is in this sense that the outcome of aus-
terity is even worse if you consider the loss of capacity, exacerbated by the
hysteresis effect, to produce output.
Jean-Claude Trichet, the former President of the European Central
Bank, in an interview in the Italian newspaper La Repubblica in June 2010,
stated emphatically:
Everything that helps to increase the confidence of households, firms and
investors in the sustainability of public finances is good for the consolida-
tion of growth and job creation. I firmly believe that in the current circum-
stances confidence-inspiring policies will foster and not hamper economic
recovery, because confidence is the key factor today. (Trichet 2010 p 1).
However, such optimism is unwarranted given that severe austerity destroys
confidence. While it has been necessary to drive down and maintain short-
term interest rates at historically low levels since the start of the financial cri-
sis, this policy has proved to be ineffective in stimulating recovery. Krugman
(2012 p 1) argues that ‘as for the effects via expected future taxes, how many
people do you know who decide how much they can afford to spend this year
by trying to estimate what current fiscal decisions will mean for their taxes five
or ten years in the future?’
In 1943 Michal Kalecki wrote an influential essay on the importance to
business leaders of the appeal to confidence. He pointed out that as we veer
off the road to full employment, governments are held to ransom by business
lobbies. These business lobbies in effect have the power of veto over govern-
ment actions, thus dictating policy in a way that suits them. If monetary and
fiscal policies are deployed effectively to fight unemployment, then business
confidence suddenly becomes redundant and most importantly the need to
cater to the whims of capitalists is much reduced.
It is in this sense that the proponents of austerity argue for a fiscal pol-
icy that focuses on deficits rather than on employment creation, and for a
monetary policy that bears down heavily on inflation and raises interest rates,
even in the face of mass unemployment. 
3. LESSONS FROM AUSTERITY: THE GREEK EXPERIENCE
Given its economic and financial situation, Greece resorted to asking for
financial assistance from the international institutions in May 2010. The
resulting financial package offered by the European Commission, European
Central Bank and International Monetary Fund (commonly referred to as ‘the
troika’) was put on the table together with the first Memorandum of
Understanding. In passing, it should be mentioned that the role of the troika
is to monitor countries in severe economic trouble that are receiving financial
loans provided by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund.
For the sake of this analysis it is appropriate that we succinctly stipulate the
strategic phases that the troika has imposed upon the Greek government.
Phase I: Public deficit and debt levels have to be rapidly reduced through cuts
in public sector pay and pensions along with significant reductions in public
and social spending.5
Phase II: The competitive position of Greece has to improve significantly
through the adoption of internal devaluation policies.
Phase III: The government should speed up the process of large scale privati-
sations as well as pursue further reductions in the salaries of civil servants.
The rationale of these policy directives rests on the notion that economic
recovery will only be achieved through improvements in the competitive posi-
tion of the country that will follow the implementation of austerity measures
such as significant reductions in the minimum wage, entitlements and pen-
sions, the weakening and restructuring of existing labour laws, a reduction in
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the power of trade unions, the invalidation of collective bargaining agree-
ments, the promotion of labour market flexibility, and so on (European
Commission 2012).
Since 2010 the implementation of the adjustment programme is the
most punitive austerity programme that Greek society has had to endure since
World War II. The price to be paid was and still remains extremely high: rapid
reduction in national income and living standards, historically high unemploy-
ment, social dislocation, degradation of the natural environment and public infra-
structure, dramatic exacerbation of poverty, cultural underdevelopment, disin-
vestment and shrinking capacity, massive privatisations and unprecedented
redistribution of income (Greek Labour Institute 2014; Alexiou and Nellis 2013).
These austerity policies have been deemed to be successful - by both
the Greek government and the troika — in so far as they have delivered stable
inflation, an external trade surplus in goods and services and a balanced gov-
ernment budget. According to the Greek government at the time, austerity was
the only effective policy option that Greece had at its disposal when the crisis
erupted. But this was clearly not the case — Greece faced an insolvency cri-
sis, not merely a liquidity crisis. In addition, the ECB chose not to carry out
unconditional purchases of Greek bonds on the secondary markets (as prac-
ticed in Japan, UK and the US). It was, therefore, a mistake by both the Greek
government and the troika to assume that a solvency crisis of debt could be
cured with a set of austerity policies. What was and is still needed is a debt
relief or debt restructuring programme.
What is worrying, however, is that even after the sacrifices that have
been made stemming from the unprecedented measures imposed on the
Greek people, there are no visible signs of a sustainable long-term recovery.
Many questions are yet to be addressed adequately, the most critical of which
can be summarised as follows:
• Assuming that Greece has reached the end of this recession, will the econ-
omy start moving up the recovery path and if so will recovery be rapid or
slow? 
• What will be the driving factors for such a recovery?
The primary objective of internal devaluation has been to galvanise
exports, by making Greek products more competitive in the international mar-
kets for goods and services (Alexiou and Nellis 2013). However, instead of
delivering economic growth, austerity measures have proven to be rather inef-
fectual and responsible for decimating the existing productive capacity of the
economy. The so-called ‘success story’ — i.e. the achievement of a balanced
budget much advertised by the Greek government — has been achieved at the
expense of the real economy. So the salient question is concerned with
whether or not the Greek economy is able to generate endogenously the nec-
essary conditions for sustainable growth. If not, then what would be the exoge-
nous factors that can trigger economic recovery?
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There is no doubt that, for an economy in distress such as Greece,
achieving higher levels of GDP (and thus lower unemployment) and a recovery
in its domestic demand without a deficit in its external trade balance would
require lower prices of domestic products (i.e. increased price competitiveness)
to offset the leakage effects of imports. However, this is unlikely given that
Greece has a chronically low export/GDP ratio relative to its import penetration.
Prices in Greece have exhibited significant rigidity, as the unprece-
dented reduction in unit labour costs have not been passed on to prices per
se. In particular, during the first four years of internal devaluation, prices
failed to decline, even after taking into account the effect of indirect taxation
(for more details see Greek Labour Institute, 2014). Consequently, the reduc-
tions in unit labour costs, instead of being converted into price reductions and
increased competitiveness as predicted by the theory of internal devaluation,
have caused average profit margins to increase significantly (Alexiou and
Nellis 2013). The failure to deliver lower prices could, to a great extent, be
attributed to a number of factors such as: the oligopolistic structures perme-
ating the Greek economy; the on-going disinvestment of fixed capital; liquidi-
ty problems; and potentially the reluctance of the then government to deregu-
late goods markets effectively prior to labour market reforms. As Barber (2014
p 1) puts it, it is down to the government’s ‘desire and capacity to continue the
arduous modernisation effort begun in 2010 — or whether it will maintain old
structures of clientelism, corruption and oligarchy under a façade of obedi-
ence to foreign overlords’.
In addition industrial policy, which is instrumental in improving struc-
tural competitiveness, is conspicuous by its absence. Structural competitive-
ness is critical for long-term growth and any polices designed to stimulate
growth will be compromised if structural competitiveness is not established.
However, the impact of such factors can only be temporary in nature, in the
sense that these alone cannot support a substantial and long-term sustainable
growth pattern in exports. Notwithstanding this, they may trigger a growth stim-
ulus, provided that a new regime of capital accumulation endowed with self-sus-
taining capabilities is in place. The pre-crisis neoliberal policies that were based
on borrowing and indebtedness, speculation in financial markets and construc-
tion activity, have failed dismally. An alternative framework that will drive the
Greek economy out of the recessionary quicksand is desperately needed.6
The current bailout framework which was agreed in July 2015 — after
six months of hard negotiations between the left-wing government of SYRIZA
and the creditors — is even stricter in nature, hence rendering the new pro-
gramme unattainable in the long run (Mazzucato, 2015). According to Roberts
(2015 p 1) the ‘Greek parliament has submitted to the troika “fiscal water-
boarding” and agreed to the terms of a new “bailout” programme that will tie
the Greek economy to the rule of the euro institutions and the IMF for at least
three years…….and will mean that the majority of Greeks will have austerity
and reduced living standards imposed for the foreseeable future’.
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The terms of the newly-established agreement that have been imposed
on the Greek government by the troika are based on the following conditions:
deregulated labour markets and low wages; high profitability; low taxes on
businesses and income from property; higher taxation of employees and pen-
sioners; productive investment which increases profit; public expenditure
cuts; social degradation; reduction in state subsidies, pension funds, health,
education and welfare; an increase in the average size of firms through merg-
ers and acquisitions; the centralisation of production and trade in fewer and
larger enterprises; the development of high-income tourism, and the privati-
sation of major public utilities.
3.1. Experience since austerity (2008-2015)
As Figure 1 illustrates, austerity policies have coincided with a sharp down-
turn in the Greek economy and a deterioration in the living standards of the
Greek population. At the time of writing, it is estimated that GDP per capita
at constant prices has declined by more than 23 per cent over the period since
2008, resulting in a sharp decline in the purchasing power of individuals. In
addition, labour productivity has fallen, indicating that the burden of adjust-
ment has largely been absorbed by significant adjustments in the labour mar-
kets, raising unemployment by 20 percentage points (European Commission
2014).7
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Figure 1. Labour Productivity and GDP per capita (€000's, 2005 prices)
Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
An additional development that will have significant implications for
the structure of the labour market relates to the deregulation, as well as the
weakening, of collective bargaining. Such a prospect will lead to a deteriora-
tion in the bargaining position of workers, a reduction in nominal and real
wages in the private sector, and a consequent reduction in private consump-
tion. Shrinking demand can be expected to lead to further reductions in pro-
duction, further increases in unemployment resulting in a vicious circle of
self-sustained recession, dwindling demand and unemployment and reduced
wages (Alexiou 2010; Arestis and Sawyer 2005; Alexiou and Nellis 2013).
The contractionary effects of continued austerity have taken their toll
on domestic demand and, through this, on public and private sector invest-
ment. Consequently, households' pessimistic expectations about the economy
have inevitably affected consumption expenditure and have dramatically
reduced spending on assets and durables. The strict lending criteria imposed
by banks have also contributed to the downturn in economic activity.
In the years prior to the economic crisis GDP per capita in Greece, in
terms of purchasing power, was approaching that of the average of the 15
most advanced countries in the European Union. In the period 2009-2013,
however, the position of Greece relative to the EU-15 has fallen dramatically -
to that last reported in 1964 (Greek Labour Institute 2014, European
Commission 2014).
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Figure 2. GDP per capita and labour productivity as a % of EU-15(in PPP).
Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
As shown in Figure 2, over the period 1995 to 2008, GDP per capita
was on an ascending path, driven mainly by gains in labour productivity. The
decline that followed over the years 2009-2013, however, is ascribed to the fall
in relative productivity caused by the dwindling capacity utilisation resulting
from deficient demand. Average productivity in Greece in 2009 amounted to
90 per cent of the EU-15 average but the same indicator dropped to approxi-
mately 82 per cent by 2013/2014. On the basis of the latter, it is reasonable
to suggest that the 20 per cent decrease in real convergence with the rest of
the EU-15 is due to dwindling productivity (6 per cent) as well as declining
employment (14 per cent) (Greek Labour Institute 2014). In other words, the
standard of living in Greece compared to those of the average of the EU-15 has
declined considerably, mainly because of rising unemployment and faltering
productivity growth.
The European Commission (2014) anticipated that the deflationary
spiral would come to an end in 2015. This prediction has proved to be correct,
with inflation stabilising at around 0 per cent since the middle of that year. In
view of this, it is estimated that the price adjustment to the new lower level of
output has amounted to about -3 per cent, whilst the overall decline in unit
labour costs for the entire period of adjustment has exceeded 16 per cent (this
is line with the prediction of the Greek Labour Institute, 2014). In other words,
the reduction in unit labour costs only translates to approximately one-fifth of
the reduction in domestic prices. Such a development stands in stark contrast
to the theory of internal devaluation, which states that reductions in labour
costs will automatically be translated into price reductions and improved com-
petitiveness.
Figure 3 maps out the path of the GDP deflator and the export prices
of goods and services, as well as changes in the GDP deflator in relation to 37
of the most advanced countries, over the period 2009 to 2015. During the peri-
od 2009-2013, prices in Greece, compared to those in 37 developed countries,
declined by 7.2 per cent; and by 7.7 per cent when adjusted for exchange rate
effects. This reduction has been the result of a decline in domestic prices as
well as an increase in the price level of competitor countries. From the above
it follows that these reductions did not translate into reductions in export
prices of goods and services. As Figure 3 illustrates, the export prices of goods
and services have grown at least as much as prices in competing countries;
and only over the years 2014 and 2015 are they projected to exhibit a slight
decrease. In other words, export-oriented firms appear to be aligning their
prices in accordance with competitor firms rather than with unit labour costs.
This may reflect the fact that Greece (like other small countries) is a price
taker in world markets, as well as expectations of relatively price inelastic
demand for exports on the part of Greek exporters.
C Alexiou and J G Nellis
- 12 -
Figure 4 shows that Greek productivity — compared to the correspon-
ding weighted average of the 37 most developed economies — reached its high-
est level in 2003 and has reversed dramatically ever since. Arguably, apart
from the crippling effects of the financial crisis, such a performance is also
associated with the pre-crisis years when economic growth was mainly the by-
product of expansion of production of low capital intensity. The cumulative
effect over the period 2008-2013 is a decline in labour productivity of more
than 9 per cent.
It is our contention that the primary causes of such a reduction in pro-
ductivity are dwindling demand, shrinking capacity utilisation and the frail
investment environment, given that new equipment and new technological
methods in production have been conspicuous by their absence. Investment
in machinery, equipment and capital assets has decreased substantially
throughout the entire period (see Figure 5 below).
As Figure 5 illustrates, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) at constant
prices has declined markedly since 2008. However, according to the European
Commission's projections, GFCF is expected to recover in the near term. But
even if such projections are correct, it should be stressed that GFCF will only
have reverted to its 1994 levels. In other words, 20 years of investment in the
Greek economy will have been lost as a direct consequence of the financial cri-
sis, with severe consequences for long-term growth prospects and living stan-
dards.
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Figure 3. Price deflator and Export prices of goods and services relative to a group of 37 advanced
countries (2009=100)
Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
It is also worth noting that the owners of Greek businesses report the
highest share of national income in the OECD. In particular, in 2013 (in nom-
inal terms) the profit share of Greek firms as a percentage of GDP was 56 per
cent. Given the uncertain and volatile economic environment, many domestic
C Alexiou and J G Nellis
- 14 -
Figure 4. Productivity relative to 37 advanced economies (2005=100)
Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
Figure 5. Gross fixed capital formation (billions of €; constant prices, 2005) 
Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
private investors are either reluctant to engage in further investment or have
simply moved their profits out of Greece. As a result, Greece currently has the
lowest rate of investment as a proportion of GDP in the whole of the OECD.
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Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
Figure 6. Total and private fixed capital formation as a % of GDP.
Figure 7. Investment in construction, dwellings, metal products and machinery, and transport 
(billions of €, at constant prices, 2005)
Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
Figure 6 maps out private, gross and net fixed capital formation. All
three indicators follow parallel trends throughout the period. In the wake of a
crisis, however, falls in gross investment expenditure are inevitable. But the
collapse in net investment shown in the figure is particularly worrying. The
picture of the Greek economy that emerges indicates that the economy has
already entered a process of disinvestment. Figure 7 suggests that the collapse
in investment during the more painful years of the crisis (i.e. 2009-2013) is to
a large extent attributed to the concomitant collapse of investment in the
housing industry and, to a lesser extent, to the decline in investment in other
sectors (such as metal, non-residential construction or transport).
As shown in Figure 8 below, the marginal efficiency of capital has
declined sharply for five consecutive years (2008-2012), in particular given the
poor capacity utilisation and lack of technological innovation and progress.
According to the European Commission, however, in so far as the current
adjustment programme succeeds in boosting investment activity in innovative
sectors of the economy, the marginal efficiency of capital is expected to
improve substantially in the coming years.
Figure 9 provides further insight into the rate of change of the capital
stock. As we can see, by the end of the first three years of implementation of
the austerity programme, capital was growing at a steady pace. Such a devel-
opment is primarily attributable to the fact that unemployment was growing
much faster than the corresponding erosion in the capital stock.
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Figure 8. Marginal efficiency of capital
Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
Private consumption (see Figure 10 below) has declined considerably
over the recessionary period and is projected to reach levels last reported in
1999 by the end of 2015. This reduction in consumption expenditure is
regarded as one of the most significant effects of the austerity measures, given
that private consumption has been the most important contributory compo-
nent of GDP.
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Figure 9. Intensity of capital (% changes, constant prices: 2005)
Figure 10. Private consumption (% changes, constant prices: 2005)
Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
Figure 11 reflects the efforts of the Greek government to adhere strictly to the
budget deficit reduction rules implied by the fiscal consolidation policy. The
resulting effect has been an unprecedented decline in public consumption —
and by 2015, according to European Commission (2014) projections — public
consumption will have reached levels last reported in 2000.
The sharp fall in imports precipitated by the dramatic decline in
demand for consumption and investment goods has improved the trade bal-
ance of goods and services as a percentage of GDP; but the hoped-for export-
led growth has proved elusive. There is little evidence to suggest that exports
of goods and services will drive the economy out of stagnation. In 2014 the
European Commission published an indicator of export performance - equiv-
alent to the share of exports of goods and services of the destination markets
- on the basis of which export performance deteriorated significantly during
the years of the crisis. Having said that, the external balance as well as the
ratio of exports to imports has recovered significantly as the demand for
imports has fallen in line with GDP, while internal devaluation has improved
to some extent the competiveness of exports (see Figures 12 and 13). Overall,
the Greek adjustment programme that relies mainly on reductions in unit
labour costs to boost competitiveness and transform the Greek economy, has
failed to deliver the hoped-for benefits.
Figure 14 illustrates the effect of the austerity policies on unemploy-
ment and economic growth. The rise in unemployment overall, over the peri-
od 2008-2013, was approximately 20 percentage points, whilst GDP shrank
by nearly a quarter (European Commission 2014).  Ostensibly, the main bur-
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Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
Figure 11. Government consumption (% changes, constant prices: 2005).
den of adjustment has been borne by workers, as evidenced by the sharp
increase in the unemployment rate (reaching 27.3 per cent in 2013).
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Figure 12. Current account balance and External balance.
Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
Figure 13. Ratio of Exports to Imports
Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
According to internal devaluation theory, firms should react to the
reduction in unit labour costs by lowering their prices and maintaining or
reducing their profit margins, given that the high levels of unutilised produc-
tive capacity will have weakened their power in product markets and their
ability to raise prices. Instead, firms should seek to raise the volume of sales
and hence increase their profits through price reductions. The latter will
ensure that the consumer price index will adjust in accordance with the pri-
vate consumption of domestic goods. Ceteris paribus, real wages should
increase, making room for further reductions in nominal wages and labour
costs, thus improving the competitive position of the country.
In other words, demand for exports should increase whilst imports
should dwindle mainly as a result of anaemic domestic demand and increased
price competitiveness. Net exports should therefore improve considerably, with
positive spillover effects on employment and GDP growth. It is expected that in
the absence of any external shocks, this process of interaction between foreign
trade and the wage/price spiral, in combination with the structural reforms
demanded by the troika, should ensure that the system achieves long-run equi-
librium.
A different approach to internal devaluation is offered by alternative and
heterodox economists who attempt to shed light on the concept of competitiveness
by emphasising the importance of non-price structural supply-side factors such
as strengthening the capacity of the economy, the accumulation of productive cap-
ital, the improvement in the country’s specialisation in international trade, the
adjustment of the production system to the demands of international competition,
and product quality (for further details on alternative approaches see, for instance,
Britto and McCombie 2009; Stockhammer 2008; Arestis and Sawyer 2005).
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Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
Figure 14. Gross domestic product (at constant prices) and Unemployment rate
The Greek economy, however, did not exhibit any of the characteristics
implied by the theory of internal devaluation. Instead, the reduction in unit labour
costs was translated into only a marginal reduction in prices (Figure 15). The GDP
deflator declined temporarily in 2013 by approximately 2 per cent and is project-
ed to increase again in the following years. Export prices of goods and services also
declined in 2013 and are expected to stabilise at higher levels in years to follow.
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Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
Figure 15. Labour unit cost and GDP deflator (100=2005)
Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission
Figure 16. Price of Exports (2005=100)
In summary, the reduction in labour costs has been accompanied by
relatively lower inflation — when compared with other advanced countries —
but without being translated into lower prices for exports (see Figure 16
above). To reap the benefits of the policy of internal devaluation, it is impera-
tive that as well as achieving reductions in the domestic prices of goods and
services, reductions in export prices of goods and services will have to follow
suit. It is in this sense that we argue that the price setting behaviour of firms
in Greece does not rest exclusively with unit labour cost fluctuations but,
rather, with the economic conditions conducive to profitability.
3.2. Modelling the balance of trade.
We contend that the underlying change in net exports is the result of a sharp
decline in domestic demand rather than the result of improved competitive-
ness. In confirming the latter, we follow Schröder (2011) by estimating an
ARDL model, which is couched in terms of the following equation:
where (X/M) is the ratio of exports to imports (of goods and services), (D) is rel-
ative domestic demand, expressed as OECD total demand divided by the home
country's demand, and is expected to bear a positive sign reflecting the posi-
tive impact of OECD demand on the balance of goods and services; (REER) is
the real effective exchange rate (based on the consumer price index deflator)
which is expected to affect net exports negatively (reflecting a loss of compet-
itiveness) and εt is the error term satisfying the usual assumptions.
Prior to the estimation process a number of tests were conducted to
ensure that the variables used were stationary. Given the potential limitation
associated with the standard ADF test, i.e. the very low power in detecting sta-
tionarity in data series especially when the number of observations is limited
or if there are nonlinearities and structural breaks, we opted for a unit root
test that takes care of such limitations: that proposed by Kapetanios et al
(2003). The evidence obtained confirms that both variables are stationary at
the 5 per cent level of significance.8
With the variables expressed in logarithms, the slope coefficients can
be interpreted as short-run elasticities. The long-run elasticities are given by
and               respectively (see Table 1).
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a1
1.290
(5.04)*
a2
-1.256
(-4.53)*
a3
-0.076
(-0.23)
a4
0.018
(0.05)
a5
0.814
(6.31)* 0.04 0.07
Table 1. Balance of Trade - OLS Regression Results (Greece).
Short-run elasticities Long-run elasticities
Notes: (*) denotes significance at the 1% level; Adjusted R2 = 0.89; 
Diagnostics: DW = 1.97; LM = 0.57; Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey = 0.372; Jarque-Bera  p-value = 0.861
The data are quarterly spanning the period 2000Q1 to 2013Q4 and were sourced from Eurostat
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home).
Based on the standard diagnostic tests, the estimates yielded are found to be
valid. Both the Durbin Watson (DW) statistic and the LM test suggest that the
estimated model is free from autocorrelation, whilst the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test confirms that there is no evidence of heteroscedasticity. Finally, the Jarque-
Bera test confirms that the residuals are normally distributed. The coefficient of
determination (R2) is high, suggesting that around 89 per cent of the variation in
the dependent variable is explained by variations in the independent variables.
The results shown in Table 2 indicate that the point estimates of rela-
tive domestic demand are statistically significant, while the respective coeffi-
cients for the real effective exchange rate bear the expected signs but are
found to be insignificant. The lagged dependent variable (X/M)t-1 is found to be
significant and with the expected sign. As far as the signs on the long-run
elasticities are concerned they are in accordance with theory, suggesting that
an increase in OECD demand improves net exports, and a rise in the REER
(loss of competitiveness) adversely affects net exports in the long run.
The next step is to establish the extent to which the improvement in the
trade balance, since the onset of the crisis, is attributable to changes in rela-
tive demand or changes in competitiveness. To do this, we simulate the fluc-
tuations of net exports whilst keeping relative demand constant at the level of
the fourth quarter of 2007, i.e. eliminating the effect of the external balance.
Similarly, we shall also provide net export simulations by keeping the
REER constant at the level of the fourth quarter of 2007, i.e. eliminating the
effect of variations in competitiveness.
The results of the simulations reported in Figure 17 suggest that changes
in demand (D) appear to explain almost all of the variation in the external bal-
ance, whilst the impact of REER is insignificant, having practically no real impact
on the current account deficit. In other words, it can be argued that it is the
declining aggregate demand in Greece that is solely responsible for the significant
corrections in the current account deficit.9 Irrespective of any positive contribu-
tion of net exports, it would be almost impossible to compensate adequately for
the abrupt collapse in domestic demand instigated by the austerity measures
imposed by the troika.
Figure 17. Simulation of net exports 
Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission. (Authors’ calculations).
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In view of the preceding analysis, it is envisaged that the strategic
choice of policy between austerity and internal devaluation as a means of put-
ting the Greek economy back on the recovery track will further weaken the
economic and social structures of the country.
The weak performance of Greek exports exemplifies the dogmatic per-
ception held by troika that a reduction in unit labour costs will stimulate com-
petitiveness and usher in export-led growth. Along these lines, Papadimitriou
et al (2013 p 4) argue that this strategy has had adverse effects on domestic
consumption, irrespective of the channels through which any expansionary
effects of austerity might be realised, i.e. ‘the expansionary austerity via severe
fiscal contractions would not have any discernible effects on output if they
were obtained through cuts in public spending rather than increases in taxa-
tion, allowing market-based incentives to work properly’.
A report by the International Monetary Fund (2014) and a study by
Blanchard and Leigh (2013) reinforce the view of those who regard the eco-
nomic adjustment programme as a failure. More specifically, the fact that the
expected negative impact on GDP was under-estimated (as evidenced by the
fact that the fiscal multiplier was subsequently revised upwards from 0.5 to
1.5) led to over-optimistic GDP growth projections, and a consequent failure
to provide an accurate estimate of fiscal aggregates. 
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It is clear from their report that IMF staff were fully aware of the punitive
repercussions of the fiscal squeeze imposed upon Greece - but they failed to
translate this accurately into their growth forecasts. The report also goes on
to acknowledge that none of the partners seemed to view the austerity pro-
gramme as ideal but, under the circumstances, it was correct to go ahead with
it in the case of Greece, because of the considerable dangers for the euro area
and the global economy should Greece default on its debt. It also says that
there was little alternative to very rapid deficit-cutting, given the size of
Greece’s deficit and financing needs.
4.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The architects of austerity are of the view that austerity policies can achieve
stimulating effects though wage and price reductions. This can be envisaged
primarily through the channels of dwindling aggregate demand and increas-
ing unemployment, which will exert a downward pressure on wage claims and
through this will lower prices in line with wages. The resulting effect would be
an improvement in competitiveness and through this a decline in the trade
deficit. Such a rationale, however, might be inherently flawed as rigidities in
labour markets preclude market forces from driving down nominal wages suf-
ficiently, resulting in high unemployment. In so far as competition in product
markets in deficit countries is poor, prices of domestically produced goods do
not fall at the same rate as nominal wages. Most importantly, despite the fact
that unit labour costs have fallen significantly in the peripheral countries of
the EU — Greece, Spain, Portugal — unit labour costs have also dwindled in
Germany due to wage restraint policies, so the net effect might actually be that
prices in some of the peripheral countries have in fact risen faster than prices
in Germany since 1999. It is in this sense that a number of commentators
have been arguing that austerity and internal devaluation have failed dismal-
ly (see for instance, Alexiou and Nellis 2013; Kitromilidis 2011; Papadimitriou
et al 2013). What austerity has achieved is an unprecedented reduction in real
wages which, in turn, has stifled aggregate demand alarmingly.
While Greece has recently reported an improvement in its current
account position, and net exports are starting to have a positive impact on
growth, this cannot be attributed to the strategy of internal devaluation alone,
but rather to the impact of recession that Greece has been experiencing as
well as the punitive economic policies adopted. In particular, the positive con-
tribution of external demand to GDP growth is due in the main to the collapse
of imports, which has been supported by the empirical evidence presented in
this study. It is also argued that this is a result of low relative demand and not
due to an improvement in competitiveness. We also argue that this positive
contribution is not sufficient to sustain economic recovery.
An alternative policy mix is needed that will restore the level of domes-
tic demand, the level of purchasing power and the productive capacity of the
economy. It is through demand-side policies that the crippling consequence of
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unemployment's hysteresis effects can be effectively reversed in the foresee-
able future. It is imperative that the existing policies are superseded by eco-
nomic initiatives that promote a more equitable redistribution of income and
a fairer taxation system. Moreover, structural and institutional changes are
warranted in terms of tax law implementation, competition policies in goods
markets, industrial policies to promote non-traditional exports, anti-corrup-
tion and anti-nepotism-policies, as well as restructuring of the banking sec-
tor, to overcome the credit crunch.
Potentially, if the existing policies are replaced as suggested above, the
Greek economy can start entering a new phase of economic recovery, moving
to a higher growth trajectory with less unemployment and a lower external
trade deficit. It is also essential that, in the short-run, prices of domestic prod-
ucts are lowered significantly (thus increasing price competitiveness) to offset
the resulting increases in import demand at higher levels of economic activi-
ty. Subsequently, a carefully planned investment programme of technological
and productive restructuring is needed to reinforce structural competitive-
ness. In other words, re-activating the economy entails adopting economic
policies that are tailored to boost aggregate demand which, in effect, will
increase capacity utilisation as well as reduce unemployment.
In all likelihood, the implementation of austerity policies could be
regarded as legitimate if adopted by economies that feature an export-orient-
ed private sector, and if they operate in a thriving global and regional eco-
nomic environment — a case in point is Canada in the mid-1990s. But trying
to impose austerity on everyone, at once, in a recessionary global environ-
ment, is a policy alternative that is destined to fail. We feel that a more holis-
tic approach is required to deal with a multifaceted economic crisis that has
recently plagued the eurozone countries. More specifically, we strongly believe
that the eurozone crisis is complex and has to be resolved through policies
that target simultaneously the banking crisis, the public sector, the dearth of
investment and the humanitarian crisis that has been unfolding in Greece.
The long-term economic outlook for the eurozone as reflected by the
European Commission’s (2014) projections for the period 2010-2015, is bleak.
Labour productivity is expected to increase by only 1.4 per cent per year, GDP
by 1.7 per cent per year and, most alarmingly, employment by -0.1 per cent
on average per year.
It is, therefore, critical that economic policy within the EU should move
away from the punitive austerity policies already imposed on the South
European economies and move towards a European model of social cohesion
and economic development. It should be apparent that, currently, the type of
fiscal adjustment policies demanded by the creditors and the stronger
economies within the EU is predicated on the philosophical principles of the
neoliberal consensus that currently dominates economic policy in Europe.
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The case for austerity was put forward by the troika when the Greek sovereign
debt crisis erupted. The ensuing fears of a potential Greek default raised con-
cerns about the ability of other eurozone countries to manage their deficits
effectively. So what had begun as a private banking sector crisis was trans-
formed into a European sovereign debt crisis, thus shifting the burden of the
crisis from the (private) financial sector to the state. Austerity measures were
imposed in an effort to reassure and calm the bond markets, the European
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. According to
Papadimitriou et al. (2013 p 6), ‘It is inconceivable that such a large rebal-
ancing of the Greek economy could take place without a drastic change in the
institutions responsible for running the eurozone — a change that would
involve shedding discredited theories together with placing less than total
reliance on market forces’.
By scrutinising in detail a wide range of Greek macroeconomic indica-
tors, this paper provides critical evidence that the recessionary environment,
precipitated by the financial crisis, in conjunction with the austerity measures
imposed on Greece have had devastating effects on the Greek economy. While
Greece has indeed managed to improve its current account position, with net
exports contributing positively to economic growth, there is a need for caution
in interpreting this development. The empirical evidence suggests that the
shift from a negative contribution of external demand to GDP growth to a pos-
itive one is predominantly the result of the collapse of imports, rather than an
improvement in competitiveness. We believe strongly that if in the foreseeable
future there is not a reversal in the nature of economic policies towards the
real economy, with a view to creating conditions where job creation is nur-
tured, then the already disadvantaged Greek economy — in terms of techno-
logical innovation, productivity and capacity utilisation — will be exposed to
continuing stagnation and long term (relative) decline.
The left-wing Greek government (SYRIZA) which was elected in January
2015 is fighting against time in an attempt to secure some breathing space for
the economy, despite the fact that the government has had to succumb to still
harsher bailout conditions brought in by the creditors. At this point in the
economic cycle, sustainable economic growth requires that both public and
private investment initiatives are in place to provide the initial stimulus for the
economy to function again. At the same time, reforms that deal with the struc-
tural elements of the economy have to be implemented. In particular, steps
have to be taken towards revamping Greece’s tax system, as well as releasing
the revenue authorities from political and corporate influence. Pensions and
credit transmission channels in the economy are fragile. The labour market
has been severely disrupted after years of austerity, whilst productivity growth
has declined sharply. Industrial policies to promote non-traditional exports
need to be put in place. Public administration has to be modernised urgently
so that public resources are utilised more efficiently. Overwhelming corruption
and bureaucratic obstacles act as barriers to the formation of new companies,
whilst competition in product markets has been hampered.
Many observers continue to argue that the ongoing austerity pro-
gramme has failed and has left the Greek population weary of reform. Some
evidence of this failure is that, despite an unprecedented drop in wages and
costs, export growth has been relatively flat — the elimination of the current-
account deficit being due exclusively to the collapse of imports.
According to Mazzucato (2015 p 1) ‘the unwillingness to forgive at least
part of Greece’s debt was of course hypocritical given that after [World War II]
60 per cent of Germany’s debt was forgiven. A second form of hypocrisy, often
lost in the media, is just how much international private banks were saved
and “forgiven”, with little scandal amongst the finance ministers’.
In conclusion, there is an urgent need for a forward-looking plan that
focuses on sustained GDP growth and domestic demand. It is imperative that
such a plan stipulates explicitly a set of more realistic assumptions regarding
the achievement of primary surpluses that are consistent with GDP growth
rates, net investment, and export expansion. This channel is envisaged to
serve as a conduit through which Greek national debt is stabilised, hence pro-
viding the necessary environment conducive to long-term economic growth.
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ENDNOTES
1. School of Management, Cranfield University, College Rd, Cranfield, Bedfordshire
MK43 0AL. Email: constantinos.alexiou@cranfield.ac.uk. 
2. School of Management, Cranfield University, College Rd, Cranfield, Bedfordshire
MK43 0AL. Email: j.g.nellis@cranfield.ac.uk. We are grateful to the editor and the ref-
erees for their constructive comments. At the time of writing the situation in Greece is
very fluid and subject to considerable volatility. We have, however, endeavoured to
anticipate future developments and provided a platform for constructive dialogue
where possible.
3. Greece’s public debt during the decade prior to the crisis was around 100 per cent
of GDP. Since the early 1990s the gap between public sector and private sector pay
widened dramatically. According to Oxfam (2013 p 2) by 2011, ‘it was estimated that
public sector salaries were 130 per cent higher than those of private employees, while
the average difference across the Eurozone was 30 per cent. Salaries for workers in
similar categories were much higher in the public sector, creating a system of insiders
and outsiders. This, together with the failure to collect taxes, partly accounts for the
increase in Greece's public debt’. Despite the bailout efforts to reduce the Greek debt
load, the key debt-to-GDP ratio has continued to rise, making it increasingly harder to
reduce the debt burden. It is in this sense that many commentators argue that the
country is no closer to debt sustainability (for more of this see for instance, Krugman,
2015; Stiglitz, 2015).
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4. The ECB only embarked on a programme of quantitative easing in 2015.
5. It should be stressed that debt levels have to be brought down to 120 per cent of
GDP only in the long run, while the annual deficit (which was 15 per cent of GDP in
2008) has to be reduced as quickly as possible, meaning that the absolute magnitude
of the debt does not rise further and will be reduced gradually with stipulated budget
surpluses.
6. The troika had counted on FDI via a programme of privatisations as a way to improve
‘structural competitiveness’.
7. Note that data limitations mean that we use the version of the Annual
Macroeconomic Database that was published prior to the revised version in Spring
2014.
8. In the interest of brevity, we do not report the unit root test results here, but these
are available from the authors upon request.
9. Our results are in line with Uxó et al. (2014) who show that the positive contribu-
tion of net exports to growth is insufficient to drive the recovery in terms of employ-
ment creation.
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